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    发表日期:2006年7月11日 编辑:cnpsy 有5624位读者读过此文 【字体:
Reply to the Commentaries on Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Infancy

This was a wonderful opportunity to receive feedback about my work from differ- ent viewpoints, and I am grateful to all the commentators for their remarks. It helps me to know where I have communicated successfully and where I have failed, where the theory is strong and where it needs more work. Let me begin with Carey’s comments. She makes a number of insightful points, a few of which she says are quibbles and so I begin with a few quibbles in return. First, I did not mean to imply that perceptions such as redness or pain are not conscious. Consciousness of sensa- tion probably occurs in all complex animals. Rather I addressed what we can be- come consciously aware of that we are not currently perceiving. To feel pain is not the same as conceptualizing pain, and I claim that only the conceptualization can be brought to awareness when it is not actually being experienced.

 

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